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1. Introduction

military phase of the U.S. war against Saddarn Hussein&apos;s Iraqi regime
of post-war
was drawing to a close, public attention began to focus on a variety
in
Iraqs vast petroleum reefforts, including that of reactivating oil field activity
the European Journal of
serves. In an article appearing in the June 2003 issue of
International Law, we explored the rights of a belligerent occupant to work govAs the

owned oil fields.&apos; Particular attention was paid to whether the rule of usucodified
in article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations on land warfare,,2 refruct,
stricted a belligerent occupant&apos;s authority to employ new technologies in working
the reserves of the occupied state,3prohibited an occupant from increasing producernment

tion from those reserves,4or established parameters concerning the uses to which
the proceeds from the sale of such production could be pUt.5 Left completely aside,
was discussion of the relationship between the UN&apos;s oil-for-food prograM,6which governed disposition of Iraqi oil from the mid-1990s forward, and
the Hague rules on belligerent occupancy. The significance of this matter was made
readily apparent by questions raised, in the wake of the military action against
Iraq, about whether a U.S.-led coalition occupying authority, or only the UN, possessed control of transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqsoil.7

however,
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Clearly,

from the

standpoint of international relations, the ultimate answer to
indisputable importance. By some estimates, the dollar
claims against Iraq totaled nearly (US)$ 400 billion. 8 This included

that question of control had
amount

of all

yet fully compensated claims arising from the 1991 Gulf War, as well as claims
from outstanding obligations for services rendered or goods supplied to the former
not

government of Saddam Hussein, and contractual commitments previously negotiated by representatives of that government but not yet performed. At some juncture, it was feared that claimants might attempt to take legal action in various for-

eign jurisdictions

order

collect

on

least

one

what

they considered to be owed.
potential claimants indicated reservations about the strength of the legal
underpinning their own positions.9 Conversely, others were extremely confiin

to

Some

bases

dent, with suggestions that

at

claimant insisted that any U.S.

or

coalition

shipments of Iraqi oil leaving that country would be considered &quot;fair game&quot; for legal proceedings aimed at securing debt satisfaction.10 The situation undoubtedly
accounted, in part, for the mid-April 2003 position expressed by the Bush adminis-

7

See Bruce

Stanley (Associated Press), Mother of Challenges
Reviving Iraq Oil Output
Easy, Tulsa World, Apr. 12, 2003 at El, col. 2 (noting legal title is essential in order to be
able to transfer Iraqi oil, and noting U.S. has encountered difficulties on that front). See also Chip
Cummins, Oil-Export Delay Risks Damage to Northern Wells, Reservoirs, Wall St. J., Apr. 18,
2003 at A3, col. 5 (exports of oil from Iraq held up by questions regarding who has control); Felicity
B a r r i n g e r, Billions in Aid From the U.N. Is in Limbo, Official Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2003 at
A10, col. 6 (head of U.N. Iraq Programmes Office indicates transfers of Iraqi oil now complicated by
questions of who possesses authority to make legal transfers). On the fact the UN is the proper
authority to transfer title to Iraqi oil, see (Reuters), Australian urges U.N. unity to help post-war
Iraq, 27 Mar. 2003, available at &lt;wwwalertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SYD340622.htm&gt; (accessed
Apr. 15, 2003); Statements made by M. Jacques C h i r a c, President of the Republic, during his joint
press briefing with M. Rudd Lubbers, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Apr. 8, 2003, available at &lt;http://special.diplomatic.gouvfr/article-gb293.htm&gt; (accessed Apr. 15, 2003). it should be
noted that various officials from the United States have indicated that Iraqi oil belongs to the people
of Iraq. Presumably, the intent of such statements is that during the period of U.S.-led coalition occupation, Iraqs oil will be used for the benefit of Iraq. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to
which such official indications imply recognition by the United States that &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil is
vested in the state of Iraq. As belligerent occupation acknowledges the absence of any nation-wide
Iraqi controlled and overseen governing authority, the indications that Iraqs oil belongs to the Iraqi
people most likely suggests nothing more than that the benefits of such oil will be used, in one way
or another, for those who populate Iraq. It is unlikely such indications are meant to
signify that &quot;legal
title&quot; to Iraqi oil is actually vested in the United States and its occupying allies.
Note: throughout this article, reference is made to United States and its
occupying allies, coalition
allies, etc. In all cases, however, what is intended is reference to U.S.-led coalition as belligerent occupants. It should also be noted that this article does not examine the possibility that, immediately
following Saddam Hussein&apos;s ouster from power, transferability of title to Iraqi oil was placed in &quot;suspension,&quot; or &quot;abeyance&quot;.
8 See
Debts of a Dictator, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, May 6, 2003, available at
&lt;www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle-east/jan-juneO3/debt-5-6.htmi&gt; (accessed May 8, 2003).
-
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understanding with Iraq. See Martin A r n o I d, Total Confident on Chances of WinContracts, Financial Times (May 7, 2003), available at &lt;wwwglobalpolicyorg/security/
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ning

Iraq

Oil

oil/2003/0507total.htm&gt;
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community&apos;s effort

to

help Iraq move towards democratic self-rule.&quot; In any case, it was soon perfectly
clear that potential litigation associated with exports of Iraqi oil might compel confrontation of nettlesome questions regarding transferable &quot;legal title,&quot; questions
by early May, the United States began the push
Security Council resolution 1483. That resolution,
adopted on May 22, 2003, by a margin of 14 to 0, with Syria absent from the vote,
called, most importantly, for the dismantling of the Iraqi sanction regime and the
phasing-out of the oil-for-food program.12 Though the resolution may have effec-

felt better left unconfronted. Thus,

for what

eventually

became

dispute over UN versus U.S.
to Iraq&apos;s oil,
nothing to help provide an answer to
control
who had the better argument about
during the weeks right after Saddam&apos;s
ouster. Nor did it provide an answer regarding control during the oil-for-food program&apos;s phase-out period spanning the six months following resolution 1483&apos;s adoptively

eliminated the immediate

control of transferable title

significance

of the

it did

tion.

perspective than the identity of the rightful claimant to conIraqi oil during the period leading-up to 1483s adoption
&quot;legal
and eventual implementation, the differing perspectives of the UN and the U.S. on
the matter raised a more timeless and enduring problem. That specific problem
concerns the interface between UN juridical regimes articulated in Security Council resolutions, and the rights and duties of an occupying power following the deFrom

trol

a

far broader

title&quot;

over

to

a government at which Council resolutions have been directed.
involvement in Somalia, Haiti, East Timor and elsewhere has cer-

feat and removal of
The UN&apos;s

recent

tainly presented the prospect that a pre-existing UN program implementing Security Council resolutions could run into difficulties, were military action to result in
belligerent occupancy of a state to which a UN juridical regime was applied. Indeed, given current tensions regarding activities by certain states to develop nuclear
Council constructs
weapons, one can just imagine a situation in which the Security
with
a particular state, only to see
a binding scheme aimed at resolving a stand-off
subsequent unilateral military action ousting that state&apos;s government and, thus,
by U.S. Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz. See Alan Murray, In a
mood,
MSNBC,
Apr. 11, 2003; Michael 0 d i g b e, Managing Iraq&apos;s Post-War Foreign Debt
Forgiving
(Apr. 2003), available at &lt;wwwecondad.org/Iraq.htm&gt; (accessed June 1, 2003).
11

Position taken

2003 President Bush indicated he preferred to see the termination of the
speculation suggested that this preference was tied to ending the oil-forfood program and, thus eliminating the possibility of UN control over Iraqi oil. See Richard W. S t e
v e n s o n /Felicity B a r r i n g e r, Bush Urging U.N. to Lift Sanctions Imposed on Iraq, N.Y Times,
12

As

early

UN sanctions

mid-April

as

on

The

Iraq.

-

Apr. 17, 2003 at Al, col. 6. By the middle of the second week in May it had become clear that a
formal push would be made in the Security Council for a resolution to accomplish that precise objective.

See

Felicity

B

ar r

i

n

tions, N.Y Times, May 8,

Drafts a Resolution On the Lifting of Sancg e r /David L e o n h a r d t, U.S.
2003 at A14, col. 6. For the May 9, 2003, initial draft proposed by the U.S.

Text of U.S.-supported U.N. resolution on Iraq, available at &lt;wwwusatodaycom/news/world/
iraq/2003-05-09-un-iraq-text-X.htm&gt; (accessed May 12, 2003); for the May 19, 2003, final draft see
Final US-UK-Spain Draft Resolution, UN Doc. SC/2003/556, available at &lt;wwwglobalpolicyorg/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0519draftresol.htm&gt; (accessed May 21, 2003). For Security Council
see

resolution 1483,

see

S.C. Res. 1483, 22

May 2003,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483.
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raising the issue of whether the belligerent occupant must respect aspects of the
UN plan. By an examination of the problem involving Iraqi oil, specifically seeking
to illuminate the persuasiveness of the differing claims that concerned UN access
to transferable &quot;legal title,&quot; an ideal opportunity is provided for observations regarding the broader matter of the relationship between UN regimes and the law of
belligerent occupancy.
Prior to beginning, however, one would do well to keep in mind that article 55
of the Hague Regulations of 1907 generally provides adequate authority for an occupying military force to tap an occupied nation&apos;s oil resources for limited purposes.13 What complicates the situation in Iraq was the adoption by the Security
Council of resolution 986, which created the oil-for-food program in 1995,14 and
implementing 1996 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which fleshed-out

its

the particulars of the program and represented a Council authorized agreement
with the government of deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.1-5 More specifically,
the Security Council actions creating the oil-for-food program presented the prospect of

definitive

legal regime possibly capable of leaving an indelible mark on
Iraqi oil even after both war and the commencement of belligerent occupancy. Whether such could be persuasively argued undoubtedly turns
on three matters. The first concerns the precise wording of resolution 986 and its
implementing MOU. The second deals with the rules governing state succession to
earlier UN legal commitments. And the third, the relevant practice of nation-states
in regard to analogous situations in which military action by a member of the
world community ousts a government from territory previously subject to a juridical regime fashioned by United Nations&apos; diplomats. In the pages that follow, each
attempts

a

to

transfer

of these three

matters

will be taken up in

turn.

11. The Terms of the UN Documents

Creating

the Oil-for-Food

Program
It would

able

seem

title&quot;

&quot;legal

that any successful claim the UN possessed control of transferIraqi oil, and that such remained unaffected by the belligerent

to

occupancy of the United States and its

13
14
15

ment

20

to

find its

origins

in

generally the authorities cited in What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?, supra note 1.
S.C. Res. 986, UN Doc. S/RES/986,14 Apr. 1995.
Memorandum of understanding between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the GovernSee

of

May
16

allies,16 would have

Iraq

on

the

implementation

of

Security

Council resolution 986 (1995), UN Doc. S/1996/356,

1996.

of supra note 7, wherein it is suggested that statements that Iraqi oil belongs to the
Iraq could be susceptible to the reading that &quot;legal title&quot; is vested in the people of Iraq. It
cannot be emphasized strongly enough, though, that the probable intent of such statements extends
no further than to the idea of the benefits of Iraqi oil being used, in one
way or another, for the
populace of Iraq. This would be tantamount to categorizing the Iraqi peoples interest as equitable
See

people

text

of

title.
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986 or its implementing MOU. There is nothing
that bestows on that organization any sort of
the
UN
of
the
in
inherent
very nature
natural
automatic authority over
resources of member states. Indeed, article 2(7) of
the UN Charter acknowledges the independent jurisdictional sovereignty of mem-

either

Security Council resolution

regard to all domestic matters,17 of which natural resources would
surely qualify. And, numerous resolutions adopted over the years by the United
Nations explicitly confirm the sovereignty of each state over its own natural resources.&apos;8 Consequently, in the absence of some plain language in 986 or its correber

states

in

sponding MOU, there would seem little basis for suggesting that control of transferable title to Iraq&apos;s oil resides in the United Nations.
With specific regard to resolution 986, it builds upon an earlier adopted flat prohibition on member state imports from, exports to, or commercial or financial dealings with Iraq, a prohibition declared by the Security Council immediately after
Iraq&apos;s invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990.19 In doing so, resolution 986 departs
from the prohibition and explicitly permits member states to import oil from Iraq,
oil-for-food proso long as imports are made under the resolution-established
sales is called
of
such
the
receive
An
to
account
escrow
import
proceeds
grarn.20
are
and
disbursement
are
enunciated,22
responsibilities
monitoring
for,21
priorities
G
the
authorizes
ener986
resolution.23
the
in
forth
Further,
Secretaryset
expressly
al to take the kinds of actions that eventuated in the negotiation of the resolution&apos;s
implementing MOU.24 Most importantly for present purposes, however, the lanthat certainly appear to sugguage of the resolution contains two sets of references
oil was not to run indegest any UN control over transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi
finitely. The third paragra-ph of the resolution&apos;s preamble represents the first set,
and it indicates the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people convinced the Security
Council of the need for the oil-for-food program as a &quot;temporary measure,&quot; pending Iraq&apos;s full compliance with other Council resolutions.25 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of
resolution 986&apos;s substantive provisions represent the second set, and they leave no
doubt that the
gram lasts for

permission to import
a

.shall remain in force for

an

other relevant action&quot;,26 and

17

See UN

oil from

Iraq pursuant

Charter,

art.

the oil-for-food proprovides the permission
to

period. Paragraph
period of 180 days unless the Council takes
paragraph 4 that the Council &quot;expresses its intention

renewable fixed-term

3

initial

2, para. 7.

Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963); Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28,h Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N.
18

See e.g., Resolution

Doc. A/9030

on

(1974).

19

See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661, 6

20

See S.C. Res. 986, supra
See id. at para. 7.

21

note

14

22

See id.

at

23

See id.

at

para. 8.
paras. I (a), 4, 6, 11-12.

24

See id.

at

para. 13.

25

See S.C. Res. 986, supra
See id. at para. 3.

26

note

14

Aug.

1990.

at

para. 1.

at

third para. of Preamble.
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to

well

consider

favourably

renewal of the

known, the oil-for-food

provisions of [the] resolution&quot;.27 As is
regular renewal, expiring in mid-

program received

June of 2003.
The

language

from both the third

paragraph of the Preamble, and paragraph&apos;s 3
provisions, may suggest that UN bases for
control over transferable title to Iraqi oil rest on a less than ideal foundation. Interestingly, such an interpretation of the technical terminology of these provisions is
consonant with the more impressionistic view that the trade embargo on Iraq and
the various other UN measures directed at that nation were precipitated by the fact
of Saddam Hussein&apos;s stranglehold on the reigns of governmental power. And, with
his removal by the United States and its allies, the entire web of Security Council
resolutions centred on Iraq, including the resolution creating the oil-for-food program, witnessed a concomitant removal of supporting foundational rationale. Accordingly, with Saddam and his cronies gone, all previously relevant Council resolutions were at an end as well. In spite of both the simplistic attractiveness of this
interpretation and the textual support in the Preamble of resolution 986 and substantive paragraphs 3 and 4, one cannot ignore the background context and specific
terminology of other Security Council resolutions concerning the Iraqi situation.
As alluded to previously, resolution 986 was designed to permit member states
to import oil from Iraq, as long as in accordance with the dictates of the oil-forfood program. This permission constituted a specific exception from the more
overarching prohibition on trade or financial dealings with Iraq articulated in Security Council resolution 661, adopted on the heels of Saddam Hussein&apos;s aggres28
sion against neighboring Kuwait.
Following Security Council issuance in early
April of 1991 of resolution 687, setting out, among other things, the long disputed
29
the removal of 661&apos;s basic prohibition
weapons inspection obligations of Iraq,
was made contingent on Iraq&apos;s fulfillment of its
weapons obligations. Paragraph 22
of resolution 687 makes that crystal clear. The language of the paragraph states the
decision that &quot;upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated [under its weapons obligations], the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq
contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall
have no further force or effect&quot;.30 The totality of provisions from relevant resolutions thus suggest a prohibition, outside the confines of the oil-for-food program,
on all Iraqi oil trade, until the Security Council acknowledged Iraqi
compliance
with weapons obligations. And given the idea that oil-for-food required periodic
renewal, in the event permitted exceptional oil trade failed to receive Council reauthorization, the basic embargo of 661 was to reactivate.
Paragraph 14 of resolution 986 contains additional language that provides even
further illumination on such a technical interpretation of relevant texts, and on the
and 4 of the resolution&apos;s substantive

27
28

29
30

See id.

at para. 4.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See S.C. Res. 687, paras. 8-13, U.N. Doc.
See id. at para. 22.
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international community&apos;s controversy regarding control over transferable &quot;legal
title&quot; to Iraq&apos;s oil. That provision quite plainly indicates that &quot;petroleum and petroleum products subject to [the oil-for-food] resolution shall while under Iraqi title
be immune from legal proceedings and not be subject to any form of attachment or
execution&quot;.31 It then requires all member states take whatever steps are necessary
32
Admittedly,
to assure such protection under their own domestic legal systems.
be
title&quot;
under
&quot;while
of
the
proffered. But
Iraqi
phrase
may
varying constructions

completely without merit to suggest that the phrase could be read as
recognition by the Security Council that, despite the establishment of the oil-forfood program, title to Iraq&apos;s oil remained with the Iraqis until, under UN auspices,
would it be

it

was

sold

so

to someone

else, and the Council simply wanted

to assure

that the pro-

objectives were not frustrated by outsiders making claims
gram&apos;s
oil?
Accepting such a reading, and conjoining it with the notion that,
against Iraq&apos;s
in the absence of the oil-for-food program, a prohibition exists on trade in Iraqi oil,
the following implication would seem to arise. Specifically, Iraq has title to its own
oil; resolutions 661 and 687 essentially forbid member states from importing such
until Iraq complies with its UN imposed weapons obligations; the only exception
concerning importation emerges from resolution 986&apos;s renewable oil-for-food prohumanitarian

immune from extergram; UN authorized transfers made under that program are
legal claims; and, in the event a lapse in the oil-for-food program, all transfers

nal

are to

cease,

unless and until the

Security

Council

acts to remove

resolution 661&apos;s

embargo.
implementing MOU?33 Do they proreading
operative Security Council documents as intending to recognize UN continuing control over transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi
oil? Or, conversely, does a rigorous textual analysis of the terms of the MOU supWhat about the

terms

of resolution 986&apos;s

vide corroboration for

the

port the non-technical, impressionistic view that with Saddam gone, the programmatic regimes set forth in all relevant resolutions came to an end? Clearly, accept-

ing

the former

U.S.
in

military

would open the door for the insistence that, following the
against Iraq, control over transferable title to Iraqi oil remained

reading

action

the United Nations. The latter

reading,

on

port for the notion that such control devolved

the other hand, would provide supto the United States as the occupy-

ing belligerent authority.
As a whole, the implementing MOU sought to provide particular details regarding several aspects of the oil-for-food program. A distribution plan was set forth to
assure equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies within Iraq.34 The specifics
of the oil-for-food program&apos;s escrow account,35 and the contractual procedures by
which sales of Iraqi oil were to take place,36 received substantial attention. Procure-

31
32

33
34

35

See S.C. Res. 986, supra
See id.

note

14

at

para. 14.

See MOU, supra note 15.
See id. at Sec. 11, paras. 5-11.
See id. at Sec. III, paras. 12-15.
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oversight mechanisms for the distribution of humanitarian
at length. But with regard to whether UN control over
transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqs oil was envisioned as running indefinitely into the
future, the MOU contains a couple of references worth noting. These appear in
paragraphs 4 and 50 of the Memorandum itself,39 and paragraph 1 of Annex 11,40
which is made a part of the MOU by virtue of language indicating that the provisions of that Annex &quot;constitute an integral part of [the] Memorandum&quot;.41
In point of fact, both paragraph 4 and paragraph 50 of the MOU bear a striking
resemblance to the third paragraph of resolution 986&apos;s Preamble, and paragraphs 3
and 4 of the resolution&apos;s substantive provisions. Paragraph 4 of the MOU provides
that it is clearly understood by both the UN and the government of Iraq that the
negotiated regime established by the Memorandum is &quot;exceptional and tempor42 This
closely tracks the sentiment expressed in the third paragraph of resolu
ary
tion 986&apos;s Preamble. Paragraph 50 of the MOU, in line with paragraphs 3 and 4 of
986&apos;s substantive provisions, explicitly declares that the regime the Memorandum
establishes &quot;shall remain in force until the expiration of the 180 day period referred
to in paragraph 3 of the Resolution&quot; itself.43 Essentially, the language from these
two paragraphs of the MOU leave little question that the Memorandum&apos;s regime
was not to last indefinitely.
Then there is paragraph 6 of the MOU&apos;s Annex II. That Annex sets forth some
of the particulars regarding contractual arrangements to purchase and pay for Iraqi
oil, and it provides for oil export monitoring arrangements.44 In addressing the approval process for contracts to purchase Iraqi oil, the Annex clearly indicates purchase contracts and associated documents are to be endorsed by the government of
Iraq or the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization (hereinafter SOMO).45 In a
way, such language is consistent with resolution 986&apos;s paragraph 14, which, as alluded to above, recognizes Iraqs title in its oil.46 Paragraph 6 of Annex II then employs language that could be read as indicating an intent of the drafters to extend
UN control over transferable legal title for as long as possible. The language provides that the UN Secretariat and SOMO &quot;shall maintain continuing contact&quot; to
review market conditions and oil sales.47 However, it seems likely that the notion
of maintaining continuing contact expressed in paragraph 6 was simply aimed at
assuring the cooperative free-flow of information, not at manifesting a desire that
ment

monitoring37

supplies311 were

and

also treated

&quot;

36

See id.

at

37

See id.

at

38

See id.

at

39

See id.

at

Sec. VI, paras. 32-33, and Sec. VII, paras. 34-44.
Sec. L para. 4, and Sec. X, para. 50.

40

See id.

at

Annex 11, para. 1.

41

See MOU, supra note 15
See id. at Sec. 1, para. 4.

42

Sec. IV, paras. 16-18.
Sec. V, paras. 19-31.

at

Sec. IV, para. 18.

43

See id.

at

44

See id.

at

Sec. X, para. 50.
Annex 11, paras. 1-5.

45

See id.

at

Annex II, para. 1.

46

See

47

See Annex II, para. 6.

text

accompanying

supra

note

31.
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indefinitely. Nevertheless,

at

least

two

of

contemplates some sort
continuing
believing
&quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqs oil.
The first reason draws on a basic point presented earlier in connection with resolution 986s overall relationship to other Security Council Iraq resolutions, and
especially resolutions 661 and 687.48 Specifically, in the absence of the oil-for-food
program, the UN unequivocally signified that trade with Iraq was absolutely prohibited, even trade involving Iraqi oil. Up until the end of May 2003 adoption by
the Security Council of resolution 1483,49 removal of the prohibition was conditioned on certification of Iraqi compliance with its weapons obligations. Thus, in
the event of discontinuation of the permissive and limited trade regime under the
oil-for-food program, the UN&apos;s total embargo reactivated, evidencing that control
of a somewhat enduring nature had been vested in the United Nations. The opening paragraph of the MOU explicitly recognizes that its generative authority is
grounded in resolution 986.50 As a consequence, would it not seem reasonable to
suggest that the collapse of the oil-for-food program, as fleshed-out in the MOU
between the Security Council and Iraq, would merely mean continuing UN
authority over transferable title through the embargo regime of the other relevant
reasons

UN control

over

transfers of

Council resolutions?
The second
has

to

reason

for

do with what the

believing the MOU contemplates continuing UN control,
recent adoption of Security Council resolution 1483 sug-

gests about the meaning and intent of the MOU, and of resolution 986 which it
implements. Referenced here is the fact that, by taking pains to phase out trade
on Iraq,51 and further pains to authorize U.S. and allied occupants to sell
Iraqi OiJ52 and participate in managing the proceeds of such,53 resolution 1483 acknowledges that, without its adoption, UN control was probably undeniable. After
all, if the temporary nature of the UN&apos;s control over Iraqi oil, and the framework
of Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, were brought to an end by Saddam

sanctions

Hussein&apos;s removal from power, there would have been no need for such a new resolution. The adoption of such resolution signifies recognition that the successful

military action against Baghdad did not remove doubt about UN control over Iraqi
oil sales. Only through a new Security Council resolution could doubt of that sort
be once-and-for-all laid

to

rest.54

48

See

text

49

See

text

50

See

MOU, supra

51

See supra note 12 at paras. 10, 16, and 18-19.
See id. at para. 20.
See id. at para. thirteen of the Preamble, and substantive paras. 4, 8, 12-14, and 17.
Admittedly, it is also possible to read 1483s language on the ending of sanctions, and U.S. and

52
53
54

allied

accompanying
accompanying
note

supra

notes

28-33.

supra note 12.
15 at Sec. 1, para. 1.

to sell Iraqi oil, as &quot;recognition&quot; of an antedating legal reality. What cuts against that
interpretation of the resolution, however, is the fact it appears inconsistent with the contextual background drawn from all the other Iraqi resolutions, background that, as we have seen, suggests any collapse of the oil-for-food program reactivates resolution 661&apos;s basic embargo regime. To a

authority

kind of
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III. Succession of States to UN Commitments and Other

Important Considerations
Despite the fact the relevant UN documents concerning Iraqi oil seem best interpreted as having envisioned control of the transfer of that oil as under the authority
of the United Nations, what if the language of those documents failed to speak to
that

way? Would international law

in any clear

matter

in

general

offer any assis-

tance on whether or not a belligerent occupant succeeds to international commitments of an occupied state? And, would it matter that the commitments concerning
which succession was an issue were based on Security Council resolutions and

agreements, that

is to

say,

legal

documents endorsed

tion, rather than typical international treaties

eign and autonomous nation-states?
The principal codification of international
ternational commitments is the

or

by

international

an

conventions entered

rules

governing

1978 Vienna Convention

on

into

organizaby sover-

state succession to

in-

Succession of States in

Obviously, one of the central hurdles in looking to that instrument for guidance on the question of the UN&apos;s Security Council regime surviving the belligerent occupancy of Iraq concerns the ability to view the relevant
Respect of

TreatieS55.

Council documents

as tantamount to

international treaties. The Vienna Conven-

international instruments
very title, deals only with succession to those
known as treaties. Therefore, in the absence of the relevant Security Council documents being understood as the equivalent of &quot;treaties&quot;, the rules of the Convention

tion, by its

would have

no

direct

applicability.

precise status of UN actions in the form of
56
Security Council resolutions is interesting and complex. Although the UN has
been deemed to be an &quot;international person&quot;,57 with attendant rights and responsibilities, it quite correctly has not been seen as a &quot;state&quot;. Regarding that latter reality,
In connection with that matter, the

the UN&apos;s power to enter into contracts is seen as absent. This proceeds from the
fact that, since the international organization is not a state, there is a complete lack

governing municipal law system capable of recognizing, validating, and regulating UN authority to make contracts. Therefore, in the event the UN desires to
seek binding commitments with others, it is of necessity required to act by &quot;treaty&quot;
of

a

under the umbrella of international laW.58

certain extent, suggestions from some UN member-states during the days and weeks
following the ouster of Saddam that JAEA and UNMOVIC weapons inspectors return

relevancy
regarding

here. States

those

voicing

suggestions

must

have been

acutely

aware

of the

immediately
to

Iraq, have

public dialogue
together, resolu-

Iraqi oil. They also must have been aware that, taken
exports, outside the context of the oil-for-food program, until the IAEA
and UNMOVIC had certified Iraq to be free of banned weapons.
eventual exports of

661 and 687

prohibited

55

Available

&lt;www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/tresufra.htm&gt; (accessed June

56

See Clive P a r r y, The

tions

at

Treaty Making

10, 2003).

Power of the United Nations, 26 Brit. Yb. Int&apos;l L. 108

(1949).
57

See id.

at

109.

58

See id.

at

116.
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The treaty making power of the UN can be derived from four UN Charter
provisions. Article 43 is specifically applicable to the Security Council, and it empow-

the Security Council

ers

to make agreements with member countries for armed
maintain
international peace and security.59 Given the natto
of the United Nations itself, any exercise of the authority of this Charter provi-

forces and assistance
ure

sion can

by

vice

be viewed

which

a

as an act

number of

of either
states

an

international

collaborate and

act

&quot;quasi-person,&quot;60
in

a

collective

or as a

de-

corporate,
rather than individual, capacity. Article 24(l) seems to support the
concept of collective or corporate action by stating that the members &quot;agree that in
carrying out

duties

or

the

Security Council acts in their behalf&apos;. 61 Conceivably, the Security
Council&apos;s MOU with Iraq, which implements resolution 986, falls within these
authorities, especially since the individual member states could have so acted on
its

their

own,

and the Council&apos;s action

seems at

least

tangentially

connected

to

the

maintenance of international peace and security. Articles 63 and 105 of the Charter
also imply that the UN possesses the capacity to make treaty-like commitments,

but these

the General Assembly and the trusteeship authorities of the Unithe power of the Security Council.
Clearly, in light of the obligatory character of Security Council resolutions under article 25 of the Charter, whether or not resolutions are formally designated
concern

ted Nations,

not

&quot;

treaties&quot; may

bit like

arguing whether the Odyssey

written

by Homer
expressed intent and legal force of Council resolutions is all that matters. Whether
binding on
member states because they comprise part of the
corpus of general international
law, or because they represent treaties to which successor states succeed, the effect
is identical. But with respect to the ability to
argue that the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States obligates belligerent occupants to honor pre-existing
Security Council regimes, like the oil-for-food regime, in the absence of being able
to demonstrate that resolutions are regarded as &quot;treaties&quot;, one would face a difficult
task. With regard to the oil-for-food program, however, the fact Security Council
resolution 986 was supplemented with a binding MOU seems to more favorably
position the situation. The MOU represents a treaty between the Council and the
government of Iraq. And, to that extent, the MOU and implemented Security
Council resolution provides a regime upon which the Vienna Convention would
seem provisionally capable of operating.
Yet having established that the Security Council&apos;s MOU with Iraq could fall
within the scope of treaties contemplated by the terms of the Vienna Convention,
it must be acknowledged that other potential problems exist that could
prevent the
Convention&apos;s application. In particular, there is the problem of succession to treaor

seem a

another blind Greek author of the

59

See UN

60

See

Charter, art. 43.
Parry, supra note 56

at

119

(this

same name.

is the

term

used

was

In either event, the

by Parry).

See also Research in Inter-

national Law Under Auspices of the Harvard Law School, Draft Convention
with Comment 29 Am. J. Int&apos;l L. (Supp.) 686 (1935), art. 1 (a).
61 See
UN Charter, art. 24, para. I (emphasis added).

on

the Law of Treaties
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occupation. The Convention is designed to address
to rea variety of succession situations ranging from newly independent states,
The
units.
in
divisions
of
to
sovereign
multiple
borders,
resulting
political
drawing
the
Does
of
situation.
different
sort
an
of
is
entirely
matter
belligerent occupation
and
American
and
its
Hussein&apos;s
Saddam
of
by
replacement
Iraqi regime
collapse
coalition occupying forces fail to constitute an event which, under the law of state
succession, the continuation of UN control over Iraqi oil under the oil-for-food
is permanently placed in control of the
program is assured? No foreign sovereign
territory occupied. Belligerent occupancy is temporary in nature and involves little

ties in the

context

of belligerent

than administrative authority. Thus, the concept of belligerent occupancy as
Hague and Geneva provisions on armed conflict accepts that the
law of the occupied country survives occupation, except to the extent it must be
superseded or suspended in the interest of safety and security of the occupying

more

set

forth in the

some larger occupation purpose.62
occupying power is only provisionally and temporarily in administrative control of occupied territory, sovereignty, if it can said to exist in any form
in the belligerent occupant, is de facto, not de jure. The Hague and Geneva rules on
armed conflict both contemplate occupation being temporary, if not brief.63 Belliis a provisional condition that
gerent occupation is not regarded as conquest. It
does not involve the transfer of full sovereignty, as conquest doeS.64 And since the
belligerent occupant is not exercising sovereignty, it would not seem to be a succesthe law of state sucsor state. Without the presence of a successor state, ipso facto
Convention defines
Vienna
of
the
Article
be
cession would not
2(1)(b)
applicable.
b
S
of
n o t h e r in the ret
a
e
a
t
o n e
succession of states as &quot;the replacement
y
At
the
no point does the
territory&quot;.65
sponsibility of international relations for
Convention speak of a mere occupant as succeeding to the international agreements
of an ousted state. Repeatedly, it references successor states inheriting the agreeof governments of their predecessors. In the absence of the transfer or assumption
mental power that would render the beneficiary a full sovereign, the fundamental
sine qua non of the law of state succession would be missing.
Then there is the further problem of the language of article 3 of the Vienna Convention. That language clearly suggests that the Convention&apos;s codification of the
law of state succession was quite specifically not meant to apply to international
The article provides in
agreements between states and international organizations.

forces,

or

in the interest of

Given that

an

relevant part that &quot;the present Convention d o e s n o t a p p I y to the effects of a
succession of States in respect of international agreements concluded between

62

See U.S.

occupant does

Dept of
not

rights, including
63

1949)

the

Army,

right

Laws of Law

Warfare,

paras. 400 and 402

(FM 27-10)(1956). The

non-military real property, but does have
buildings and sell timber and mineral products.

of sale of

right
public

to use

usufructuary

The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 Aug.
after the close of
art. 6 provides &quot;the application of the present convention shall cease one year

military operations
64 See U.S.
Dep&apos;t
65

the

have the

of the

Army,

See Vienna Convention

on

Laws of Land

Warfare, para. 353 (FM 27-10)(1956).
in Respect of Treaties, art. 2 (1)(b).

Succession of States
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subject of international law that possesses
Thus, given the Convention&apos;s directive as

a
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Oil

an

acknowledged

character other than that of

set

a state.

forth in this

would appear little doubt should exist regarding the fact
the Convention&apos;s rules on state succession in the context

particular article, it
of the inapplicability of
of the Iraqi oil-for-food

program.

There

also the additional

problem of article 40 of the Vienna Convention. The
provision complicates the certainty of whether the Convention&apos;s
rules on state succession do or do not govern situations involving belligerent occupation. Article 40 provides that &quot;[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall
not prejudge any question that
may arise in regard to a treaty from the military
67
of
a
occupation
territory
Surely it would not seem totally unreasonable for one
to contend the choice of such phraseology supplies a colorable basis for
arguing
that the Convention has left open the possibility of treaty commitments surviving
belligerent occupation. However, it is certainly one thing suggest article 40 leaves
that possibility open, and something entirely different to suggest that means the
occupying power succeeds to those treaty commitments. To indicate the provisions
of the Convention &quot;shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a
treaty&quot; when military occupation is involved, may be read as simply signifying that
the occupation could leave the treaty in place for whatever governing body assumes authority following the conclusion of the
occupation itself. What exactly is
language

is

of that

&quot;

it that is contained in the

wording of article 40

that

compels it to be read as signifyoccupying power takes on the treaty commitments of the government that
has been displaced from authority? At best, the wording does little more than leave
open the possibility that such commitments might be left unaffected by military
occupation.
Despite the various foregoing problems, it could be argued that the basic rationale underlying the law of state succession might seem to make the particulars of
the Vienna Convention&apos;s rules applicable during belligerent
occupancy. After all,
such occupancy involves control, albeit temporary or limited, over foreign territory formerly under the control of another governmental structure. In view of this,
would it not make sense to see the operation of relevant treaties merely suspended
rather than abrogated? And, would such an approach not prove consistent with
one of the viable interpretations of article 40? Is it not
possible to envision a temporary occupation followed by a full reinstatement of the status quo ante? In such
a circumstance, occupation would merely provide a hiatus in the
operation of a
previously established governmental regime, and a hiatus in the applicability of various treaties and international commitments. In the case of Iraq today, however, it
is clear that the occupation is not temporary in that sense, and no reinstatement of
the status quo ante is at all likely or desirable. Thus, even though it might be possible, as a theoretical matter, to accept the applicability of the concepts of state sucing

the

66

Id.

at art.

3.

67

Id.

at art.

40.
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cession in situations

the survioccupancy, and thereby permit
bind the government replacing an occupying

involving belligerent

val of treaty commitments so as to
does
power, where that government

not

involve

a restoration

before, it would seem inappropriate to follow such an
Aside from the difficulties associated with law of

of what had existed

approach.
state

succession

applying

to

belligerent occupation, the doctrines of changed circumstances and impossibility of
performance would seem to be two other important considerations that could bear
of whether UN control over transferable title to Iraqi oil survived
on the

question
military occupation of that nation. Both doctrines assume the continued
existence of the two parties that originally entered into the relevant international

the U.S.

commitment. Neither doctrine

assumes

that

one

of articles 61 and 62 of the Vienna Convention

party has ceased to exist. Review
the Law of Treaties pertaining to

on

impossibility and changed circumstances respectively do not contemplate the disintreaty, and substitution with
It could, of course, be sugtemporary, de facto, quasi-sovereign administrator.
that the occupying American and allied forces are exercising the full power

tegration
a

or

dissolution of

one

of the

two

parties

to a

gested
and authority
a

of the defeated government on a temporary and fiduciary basis until
be obtained.
permanent peace treaty or final settlement arrangement can
Codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the doc-

trine of

changed

circumstances

provides

treaty commitment may not be terchanged were unforeseen by the parties,

that

minated unless the circumstances that have

a

&quot;the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent
and the effect of the change is &quot;radically to transform the extent
of the parties
of the
could

obligations still to be performed under the treaty&quot;.68 In a general sense, it
be argued that the changed circumstances incident to Iraq being under the

authority of the occupying coalition powers would seem to meet this test. At the
time of occupation, Saddam Hussein&apos;s government had dissolved, and thus there
left to perform the varwere no official instrumentalities of the former Iraqi regime
duties under the oil-for-food program. Furthermore the fundamental purpose
of the program, the &quot;essential basis of the consent of the parties&quot;, had disappeared.
oil revenues would no longer be diverted to weapons activities, and the people
ious

Iraqi
of

at

least have

it could be

suggested

Iraq would

ever,

.radically
obligations

transform the

access to

that the
extent

needed food and medicine.

Conversely,

change in circumstances that occurred
obligations still to be performed

how-

did

of the

not

The

Iraqi oil sales under the terms and conditions of the
adhere to the mechanisms assuring that the United
and
then
oil-for-food program,
Nations controlled the application of those revenues so as to provide for the essential needs of the Iraqi people. Even after the commencement of coalition occupation, these obligations remained in place, and the intent of the Security Council in
were to

conduct

that respect clearly emerged from the
adoption of resolution 1483.69

68

See Vienna Convention of the Law of

69

See

text

accompanying

background

Treaties,

Art. 62

context

associated with the

(1) (a) and (b).

supra Sec. H.
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The doctrine of

impossibility, under article 61, finds itself in a similar situation.
provides for invoking the doctrine &quot;if the impossibility results from the
permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty&quot;. Obviously, following the commencement of occupation, no Iraqi government operatives existed to serve as contacts with the UN under the oilfor-food program. Nor were there any Iraqi agencies to make the decisions regarding the sale procedures and prices of the Iraqi oil. Thus, it could be suggested that
the program envisioned by the earlier UN-Iraq MOU, and resolution 986 which it
implemented, became impossible to perform. On the other hand, though, only the
continued existence of Iraqi oil proves an &quot;object indispensable&quot; for the MOU&apos;s
execution. And in spite of the operations associated with occupying Iraq, that oil
remains in-place and available for sale. Administrative organs, like SOMO, can easily be reconstituted or replaced by comparable organs established by the occupying powers. The fact that their existence or operation is affected by the ouster of
the supporting regime does not produce the &quot;permanent disappearance or destruction&quot; of the very thing that is essential for the execution of the oil-for-food
proThe article

gram.

Why then did the occupying coalition return to the UN to seek the passage of
Security Council resolution 1483? The answer seems to lie in simple commercial
reality: the vulnerability of occupant-produced and sold Iraqi oil to international
litigation. Even if court adjudication of an attachment of a tanker of Iraqi oil for a
pre-existing debt or some other claim were ultimately settled in favor of the occupying powers, a great deal of time, energy, and money would, of necessity, be expended. Some jurisdictions might prove unreliable or hostile in litigating the controversial question of UN or U.S. control over transferable title. The
certainty of
numerous claims by Iraq&apos;s
many substantial creditors would render disposition of
that nation&apos;s crude oil difficult, if not impossible, without dollar for dollar
guaranIn

tees.

short,

once

Iraqi

oil

was

placed

the many uncertainties of international
eliminate or minimize such proved the

effort

what

to secure

finally

the high seas, it would be vulnerable to
judicial proceedings. Clearly, the desire to
driving force behind the coalition powers&apos;
on

became resolution 1483.

IV. UN Practice and

Commitments

Belligerent Occupant Inheritance of
Deriving From UN Imposed juridical

Regimes
What does
international
Does

support the proposition that an occupying power is bound to obantedating international legal regimes that had been applicable to a certain

pation?
serve

practice show with regard to whether obligations established by
organizations survive the onset of de jure or de facto belligerent occustate

it

territory prior
suggest that

to

the

commencement

antedating

regimes have

of such

generally

occupation? Or, conversely, does it
been viewed as ending with the in-
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belligerent occupation? In either case, to what extent has language used
legal instruments creating the regime seemed pivotal in regard to the matter
of regime survival? Has it appeared that, in the absence of language suggesting
duration of an indefinite nature, the regime has been seen as at an end? Or has it
seemed that a legal regime, once established and made applicable to a territory under the control of a particular government, remains applicable in spite of the targeted government&apos;s removal by military forces of another nation?
The Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor situations were referenced in the opening
paragraphs of this essay. However, given that all three involved the introduction of
outside military forces operating under the auspices of the United Nations, the
1974 Turkish invasion of the island of Cyprus, and the 2001 Afghanistan action by
U.S. and allied military forces, seem perhaps more directly relevant to the Iraq si-

itiation of
in the

tuation. In contradistinction

to

Somalia, Haiti, and

East Timor, both of the latter

situations, just as in Iraq, involved a pre-existing international legal regime established by the United Nations, with subsequent external military action placing
two

territory affected by the regime under the control of either a de jure or a de facto
occupying power. On the island of Cyprus, the subsequent external military action
resulted in substantial numbers of Turkish forces remaining on the island to this
what is essentially 40 % of the island&apos;s northern portion. In
very day, occupying
the situation has been somewhat distinct. While American
units remain in that country, force structures have decreased,

Afghanistan, however,
and coalition

military
operations and security assistance provided to Afghanistan&apos;s new internationally supported government serving as the main objectives.
Cyprus. With greater specificity to the continuing presence of Turkish military
forces in Cyprus, one would do well to recall that hostilities between the majority
Greek-Cypriot and minority Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants proved a complication
for the island&apos;s British overseers for a number of years following the Second World
War. 70 In 1960, however, London was able to mastermind a negotiated compromise
between itself, Greece, Turkey, and the two antagonistic ethnic communities on the
island. The compromise produced a new constitution for the Republic of Cyprus,
and treaties between the negotiating nations. The treaties were signed on 16 August
1960 in Nicosia, Cyprus, and guaranteed the island&apos;s independence and assured
both non-interference by Greece or Turkey as well as recognition of the Cypriot
constitution.71 By late 1963 and early 1964, it had become clear to the UN Security
Council that the resumption of ethnic hostilities between inhabitants of the island
threatened to bring Greece and Turkey into confrontation with one another.72 On
4 March 1964 the Council thus adopted resolution 186,73 which did several things

with mop-up

70

See

Cyprus:

Two Nations in One

Island,

Bow Educational

Briefing

No. 5, Pt. 1, available

&lt;http://faculty.menlo.edu:8080/-jhiggins/tcvoices/bowpartl.html&gt; (accessed May 29,
71

See id. and Bow Educational

Briefing

No. 5, Pt. II.

Security Council, 1964-65
Depts/dpa/repertorie/64-65-08.pdf&gt; (accessed May 28, 2003).
Practice of the

72

See

73

See S.C. Res. 186, UN Doc. SC/RES/1 86, 4 Mar. 1964.

Repertorie

at

2003).

at

108-111, available

at

&lt;wwwun.org/
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significance. These included calling on member states (e.g., Greece and Turkey,
particular) to refrain from actions likely to worsen the situation,74 urging the
government of Cyprus to take measures to stop bloodshed,75 and creating the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to assist in the prevention of fighting. 76 Of the various provisions of the resolution, especially important
was the reference in the second paragraph of the preamble. That paragraph provided that the Council&apos;s listing of measures, such as UNFICYP&apos;s creation, and the
call for avoidance of bloodshed and actions that might worsen the situation, was
made in full &quot;[c]onsider[ation] [of] the positions taken by the parties in relation to
the treaties signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960 77 Essentially, the preambular
statement suggests Security Council recognition that the concerned parties had
settled upon a completed plan designed to resolve long-standing differences, and
that the situation on the island brought about in March of 1964 by the government
of Cyprus was clearly at variance with that plan.
What makes such an understanding of the preambular statement in the second
paragraph all the more convincing is the language in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 186&apos;s substantive provisions. Both of these paragraphs are directed at Cypriots,
with the former requesting the Greek-Cypriot controlling government of the island &quot;take a I I additional measures&quot; to dampen the violence, 78and the latter calling
of
in

&quot;

on

the ethnic communities and their leaders

the

context

of the second

paragraph

of the

to

&quot;act with the

preamble,

utmost

these

two

restraint&quot;. 79 In

substantive para-

would suggest nothing be done to undermine the previously negotiated
1960 compromise solution. Measures by the Greek-Cypriot government frustrat-

graphs
ing

the

objectives

of the

Republic&apos;s

both paragraphs 2 and 3. Such

1960

measures

constitution, would

represented

a

refusal

appear
to

to contravene

take &quot;all&quot; the addi-

tional steps to break the cycle of violence, as required by paragraph 2, and demonstrated a further refusal to &quot;act with the utmost restraint&quot;, as required by paragraph
3. Both

paragraphs from the resolution&apos;s substantive provisions were inextricably
the Security Council&apos;s full &quot;[c]onsider[ation]&quot; of the positions taken by
Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the two ethnic communities on Cyprus, in their signbound

to

ing of the

1960 Nicosia treaties.

From 1964 until

these either

74

See id.

at

75

See id.

at

76

See id.

at

77

See id.

at

78

See id.

at

79

See id.

at

of 1974, the

Security Council adopted various additional
addressing the situation in Cyprus.80 By-and-large,
extended UNFICYPs operational mandate,81 or spoke to especially

resolutions and

July

statements

para. 1.
para. 2 and 3.

para. 4 and 5.
second para. of Preamble.
para. 2.
para. 3.

80 For
a survey of the resolutions, and debates thereon, see Repertorie Practice of the Security
Council, 1966-68 at 105-113, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorie/66-68-08.pdf&gt; (accessed
May 28, 2003); id., 1969-71 at 121-126, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorie/69-71-08.pdf&gt;
(accessed May 28, 2003); id., 1972-74 at 144-159, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorie/7274-08.pdf&gt; (accessed May 28, 2003).
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significant episodes in the ethnic hostilities on the island.82 Resolution 207 deserves
particular mention, as it diverges somewhat from this pattern. The Security Council adopted the resolution on August 10, 1965, in response to actions of the controlling Greek-Cypriot government that were generally seen as inconsistent with the
earlier 1960 compromise.83 During the Security Council&apos;s deliberations on the two
brief substantive provisions of the resolution, several Council members explicitly
criticized the Greek-Cypriot government for contravening the terms of resolution
186 through measures taken by that government in violation of the Cypriot constitution.84 Presumably, in the estimation of these Council members, it was such contravening action that necessitated resolution 207&apos;s adoption. When these criticisms
are conjoined with the fact the resolution left absolutely no doubt the terms of resolution 186 were being reaffirmed, the reality that the 1960 negotiated compromise solution was envisioned by the Security Council as surviving efforts to undo
it seems beyond serious challenge.
This

impression

same

emerges from resolution 244 of December 22, 1968, and

through the adoption of resolution 353, unanimously agreed upon by the
Security Council contemporaneously with Turkey&apos;s sending of occupying military
forces to the island of Cyprus. Paragraph 5 of resolution 244 explicitly urges the
continues

parties to undertake determined efforts &quot;with a view to keeping the peace and
arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution
186 ...&quot;.85 The second preambular paragraph of resolution 353 expresses the Council&apos;s concern about the need for restoring the constitutional structure of Cyprus
established and guaranteed by international agreements&quot;, undoubtedly those of
1960, and the third paragraph indicates the Coi recollection of &apos;41ts resolution
11

186

(1964) of

radical shift
1960
tion

4 March 1964 ...&quot;.86

in

the

However, what appears

Security Council&apos;s approach

legal regime begins
of military forces.

to

on

to

be

a

monumental and

the survival of the

unfold within 5 months of Turkey&apos;s

July

pre-existing

1974 introduc-

Security Council adopted resolution 365, by a conover the long, unsuccessful efforts to implesensus
Apparently,
well
the
bifurcation of Cyprus effected through the
as
ment the 1960 solution, as
On December 13, 1974, the

frustrations

vote.87

81

Originally,

UNFICYP had

para. 6. That mandate was later
RES/206, 15 June 1965.
82

a

three month renewal mandate. See S.C. Res. 186, supra note 58 at
to six months. See S.C. Res. 206, para. 5, UN Doc. S/

lengthened

Aug. 1964 (Turkish aerial attacks); Appeal by
Repertorie Practice of the Security Council,
&lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorie/64-65-08.pdf&gt; (accessed May 28,

See e.g., S.C. Res. 193, UN Doc. S/RES/193, 9
Security Council, 5 Nov. 1965, cited

President of the
1964-65

at

125-126, available

at

in

2003) (Greek-Cypriot cleansing actions against Turkish-Cypriot coastal town of Famagusta).
83 See S.C. Res.
207, UN Doc. S/RES/207, 10 Aug. 1965. See Repertorie Practice of the Security
Council, 1964-65 at 125, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorle/64-65-08.pdf&gt; (accessed
May 28, 2003).
84 See
Repertorie Practice of the Security Council, id. at 124-25.
85 See S.C. Res. 244 at
para. 5, UN Doc. S/RES/244, 22 Dec. 1968.
86 See S.C. Res. 353 at
paras. 6 and 7 of the Preamble, UN Doc. S/RES/353, 20 July 1974.
87 See S.C. Res.
365, UN Doc. S/RES/365, 13 Dec. 1974.
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military forces, resulted in the Council recognizing the
need for an entirely new approach. The approach the Council opted for was reflected in a recently adopted unanimous resolution of the UN&apos;s General Assembly,
resolution 3212. Without specifying the details of resolution 3212, it essentially envisioned the negotiation of a completely new constitution between the two ethnic
communities on Cyprus. Security Council resolution 365 embraced this approach.
Paragraph 1 of that resolution expressly provided that the Council &quot;[e]ndorses
General Assembly resolution 3212
and urges the parties concerned to implement
of resolution 365&apos;s adoption, Turkish-CyWithin
weeks
it as soon as possible&quot;.88
the
declared
from
Republic of Cyprus, thus leading the Security
priots
separation
Council to adopt resolution 367, reaffirming commitment to the new course and
condemning separatist inclinations.89 That same reaffirmation of commitment repeatedly appeared in subsequent resolutions in 197690, 197791, and 197892. References in any of the relevant resolutions to the earlier resolution 186 might be suggested as indicating a continuation of the 1960 regime. Such suggestions, however,
seem thoroughly undercut by the fact the language of the resolutions as a whole
reflects nothing but Council approval of 186&apos;s establishment of UNFICYP and
introduction of Turkish

other related

matters.

preceding it is clear that, up until the 1974 Turkish occupation of the
northern portion of Cyprus, the resolutions of the Security Council viewed the
pre-existing 1960 legal regime as surviving evolving political developments on the
ground. With the commencement of belligerent occupancy, however, the Council
plainly recognized the need for change. Thus, the 1960 solution was no longer seen
as viable. The suggestion thus arising is that UN practice does not support the continuation of pre-existing international legal regimes following belligerent occupation. However, such an explanation, in the context of the Cyprus situation, emerges
from the Council&apos;s deliberate effort to cast the language of its resolutions so as to
reflect UN acceptance of a new political reality. With regard to Iraq, over the years
the UN fashioned an extensive and elaborate network of legal obligations applicable to Baghdad. And, unlike with its resolutions on Cyprus, the Security Council&apos;s
relevant Iraqi resolutions, when judged against the backdrop of resolution 1483,
appear to be intended to survive belligerent occupation.
Afghanistan. As for Afghanistan, the situation seems to have been more akin to
that involving Iraq than to the situation involving Cyprus. Essentially, the UN
sanctions imposed against Afghanistan&apos;s pre-occupation Tallban government came
under immediate Security Council review following the American military action
taken on the heels of al-Qaeda&apos;s September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
From the

States. The review,

however, did

88

See id.

89

See S.C. Res. 367

at

90

See S.C. Res. 391

at

91

See S.C. Res. 410

at

92

See S.C. Res. 440

at

at

not

result

in

an

immediate

move

to

undo the

para. 1.

paras. 2, 4, and 5, UN Doc. S/RES/367, 12 Mar. 1975.
para. 2, UN Doc. S/RES/391, 15 June 1976.
para. 2, UN Doc. S/RES/410, 15 June 1977.
para. 1, UN Doc. S/RES/440, 27 Nov. 1978.
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antedating sanctions regime. The implication flowing from this is that all
legal regime established prior to the U.S. military action against
portions
were
deliberately contemplated as surviving the belligerent occupation
Afghanistan
that followed. In large measure, this appears to buttress the impression that
whether or not a UN legal regime survives de jure or de faao belligerent occupation turns more on the particular language of relevant Security Council resolutions
than on some universal, general rule applicable in each and every conceivable situation. Two observations merit reference, however, prior to detailing the Security
Council resolutions suggesting the aforementioned conclusion regarding the Afghan situation. First, the fact the Security Council may have explicitly continued
the UN sanctions regime against Afghanistan, even after occupation by U.S. and
allied forces, may suggest nothing more than that UN regimes survive when cast in
language permitting such, but not when the Council opts for some alternative formulation. Cyprus is a prime example of the latter case. And second, the situation in
Afghanistan saw the initial military action and occupation by the United States and
its allies overtaken by a UN approved international security assistance force
(ISAF) charged with stabilizing the countryside and aiding transition to a new governing structure. In such a context, the continued involvement of an antedating
UN legal regime is quite explicable.
The most relevant resolutions of the Council begin with resolution 1267 in late
1999.93 Though others had been adopted by the Council as early as October of
1996, immediately after the Taliban&apos;s emergence as the dominant political force in
the civil war that battered Afghans following the former Soviet Union&apos;s withdrawal
in 1989,94 those resolutions were restricted to condemning the Taliban for its treatment of women, tolerance of terrorist groups and international drug trafficking, religious and ethnic persecution, and lack of respect for the country&apos;s cultural heri95 With 1267 the
Security Council initiated its sanctions regime
tage and treasures.
4
against Afghanistan. By paragraph of the resolution, the Council indicated it intended to institute a flight ban on Ariana Afghan Airlines, the airlines owned,
leased or operated by or on behalf of the Afghan government, and freeze funds
owned or controlled by the Taliban.96 The specifics of the resolution triggered
Council&apos;s

of the UN

these

sanctions once

the Taliban refused

to

accede

to

the UN&apos;s demand that Osama

bin Laden, incriminated in attacks against U.S. embassies in east Africa, be handed
over to appropriate authorities for prosecution.97
December 2000 saw the Security Council&apos;s next instalment in the sanctions re-

gime against Afghanistan.
93

Resolution 1333 demanded Taliban

compliance

See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267,15 Oct. 1999.
See Gilles D o r r o n s o r o, The World Isolates the Taliban:

with

Afghanistan All Alone, Monde Diplomatique (June 2001), available at &lt;wwwglobalpolicyorg/security/sanction/afghanistan/2001/0619tali.htm&gt; (accessed June 5, 2003).
95 See
generally S.C. Res. 1076, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1076, 22 Oct. 1996; S.C. Res. 1193, U.N. Doc.
94

S/RES/1193,
96
97

28 Oct.

1998; S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214, 8 Dec. 1998.

See supra note 93 at para. 4.
See id. at paras. 2 and 3.
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supply

of

arms

and

re-

territory under Taliban control, and directed all states to prevent
the provision of technical assistance or training to the Taliban.99 Additionally, para8 directed all states to close Taliban offices in their territory and freeze assets
lated material

to

graph

of Osama bin Laden and individuals or entities associated with him.100 Paragraph
11 followed this by requiring all states deny any aircraft flight clearance if that aircraft left from or landed in Afghan territory under Taliban control.&apos; 01 By the terms
of
23, the Security Council indicated its decision to continue the afore-

paragraph

mentioned sanctions for one year, with possible renewal for additional Periods, de02
pendent upon Taliban compliance with Council demands.&apos;
Subsequent to resolutions 1267 and 1333, the Security Council adopted several
other resolutions regarding Afghanistan, a couple of which deserve passing referThese include resolution 1373, adopted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
in the
on the United States, and resolutions 1378 and 1386, both adopted
all
that
demanded
1373
Resolution
of
months
2001.
states, though
concluding two
ence.

attacks

cooperate in efforts to control international
terrorism.103 Resolution 1378, adopted after U.S. and allied military action to refor Afmove the Taliban from power, reaffirmed 1267 and 1333, and urged support
not

mentioning Afghanistan by

ghanistan&apos;s

effort

to

name,

to a more democratic and civil form of governing
facilitating the transition, and to provide international supmilitary units, resolution 1386 both established and empow-

transition

structure.&apos; 04 To assist in
to

port
ered

a

U.S. and allied

UN international

security

assistance force

Bonn Agreement signed December 5, 2001,
following the Taliban&apos;s ouster.&apos; 05

by

(ISAF),

consistent with the earlier

the various factions

vying for power

While the relevance of 1373, 1378, and 1386 is apparent, they add little to the
sanctions regime established by resolution 1267 and 1333. They do, however, set
the stage for two additional resolutions of substantial import in that respect: resolutions 1388 and 1390. Both resolutions were adopted in mid-January 2002, many
weeks after the U.S. military had consolidated its position in Afghanistan and removed the Taliban from power. With respect to 1388, paragraphs 1 and 2 made
clear the Security Council was not prepared to do more than lift the limitations.imposed by the sanctions regime on Ariana Afghan Airlines.106 As if to emphasize

extremely restricted nature of the Council&apos;s willingness to relent on the pre-existing sanctions regime, the day after resolution 1388 was adopted, the Council rethe

98

See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333, 19 Dec. 2000,

99

See id.

at

para. 5.

100

See id.

at

101

See id.

at

para. 8.
para. 11.

102

See id.

103
104

at para. 23.
See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373, 28

See S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/1378,

Sept.

at

para. 1.

2001.

14 Nov. 2001, first

paragraph

of Preamble and

para. I of su6stantive provisions.
105 See S.C. Res.
1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386, 20 Dec. 2001, paras. 1 and 3.
106 See S.C. Res.
1388, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1388, 15 Jan. 2002, paras. 1 and 2.
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iterated,

in

continued

paragraph

1 of resolution

survive the

1390, that the other dimensions of the regime

foreign military occupation

of

Afghanistan.107 Paragraph
the Tallban, and those associated with them.108 Interestingly, the U.S. apparently favored the action taken
by the UN both to continue and to expand the principal dimensions of the Afghan
sanctions regime.&apos; 09 With the subsequent adoption by the Security Council on Jan2 then

to

imposed

further financial and transit sanctions

on

uary 17, 2003, of resolution 1455, the international community left

unequivocal

intent

the sanctions

regime for

no

doubt of its

additional year,

an
despite
military forces remaining in Afghanistan.110
Any fair and impartial evaluation of the Afghanistan situation would have to acknowledge that the UN sanctions regime with regard to that nation survived the
occupation by U.S. and coalition allies. Admittedly this occurred in the context of
eventual Security Council approval of an ISAF, thus giving at least tacit, after-thefact blessing to the American military action against the Taliban and its sympathizers. It also occurred against a backdrop of U.S.
support for continuation of the
Council&apos;s
sanctions
Security
Afghan
regime. Nonetheless, when looked at with the
and
situations
in
mind, Afghanistan certainly suggests the UN knows
Cyprus
Iraqi
how to stress that its pre-existing legal regimes remain viable and in-place long
after foreign belligerent military occupation. From this, would it not seem safe to
conclude that, rather than state practice establishing some general rule providing
pre-existing regimes of international organizations survive or are destroyed by belligerent occupancy, their status is to be determined on a case-by-case basis? Would
it not seem reasonable to conclude that the only sure
way to unravel the question
of whether the UN legal regime governing transfers of Iraqi oil remained intact
after U.S. and allied occupation of Iraq, is to search out the international community&apos;s intent as reflected in the precise wording of Security Council resolutions
adopted before and after the relevant military action? And, as has been seen earlier,
would it be completely without merit to read those Council resolutions on Iraq as
envisioning the continuation of UN control over transferable title to Iraqi oil, even
after foreign military occupation of that country?

to continue

American and allied

V. Conclusion
The relevant

Security Council documents, general international rules concerning

the succession of

states to

tions

to

international commitments, and state practice in situacomparable
arising in Iraq, suggest there is reason to believe the UN
controlled the transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil in the immediate aftermath of
that

107

See S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc.

108

See id.

109

para. 2.
See Nicholas K r a I

2002), available
June 5, 2003).
110

S/RES/1390,

16

Jan. 2002,

para. 1.

at

at

e

v,

US

to

Ask UN for

Continuing Afghan Sanctions,

Wash. Times

See S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/1455,

17

Jan.

2003.
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to

against Baghdad. Both this conclubroader question of the continuation

action

casts on

the

juridical regimes following belligerent occupation, prove significant. Howin summary form the reasons for
ever, forgoing an opportunity to either reiterate
that conclusion, or explore in any detail the implications, for the broader question,
of the particular situation in Iraq, another seemingly more fundamental point bears
observation. Specifically, UN involvement in various aspects of managing the postand difficulty of
war Iraqi situation cannot help but add to the sheer complexity
United States
the
cleaner
and
be
easier
were
would
It
tasks
encountered.
the
clearly
the full
about
decisions
of
the
left
be
in
and its principal allies to
making
position
the
domestic
to
stability initiating
prorange of matters from re-establishing Iraqi
in between, such as Ircess for creating future governing arrangements. Everything
aqi oil sales, the use of proceeds therefrom, the honoring of preliminary and final
oil contracts entered into by the government of Saddam Hussein, could surely be
disposed of far more neatly were the number of nation-state decision-makers kept
of UN

to

a

minimum.

The

recently adopted Security Council resolution

streamlined and unilateralist

course

of action. And,

1483 does

as we

not

opt for such

a

seen, there is plenty
operative, in connection

have

suggest that such a course of action was not
with transferability of title to Iraq&apos;s oil, prior to the adoption of that resolution. A
true conflict would have arisen between the UN&apos;s oil-for-food regime and the occupant&apos;s rights under the Hague regulations had the Security Council refused to
of evidence

to

occupying coalition, with its heavy burden of
citizenry, have been barred from sale of
essence of the UN&apos;s oil-for-food regime
the
while
affirmative
answer,
concept of necessity so implicit in the Hasuggests an
for
the
of
rules
and
Geneva
war argues
contrary. Assuming litigation regarding
gue

pass 1483. In such

a

case,

would the

restoring order and providing for the Iraqi
Iraqi oil to meet occupation purposes? The

transfers of title, would the U.S.-led coalition have been held to have committed
tortuous conversion had it acted to sell Iraqi oil to pay for relief efforts? In some
and the Hague
respects, resolution 1483 exposes the inadequacy of both the UN
regimes, and the virtue of the existence of the United Nations. Clearly, the oil-forfood regime had been compromised by Iraq&apos;s occupation. On the other hand, without UN support, the difficulties of the coalition meeting its responsibilities as an
invade without the
occupant were apparent. That the world&apos;s superpowers could

of the UN, but not occupy Iraq effectively without that organization&apos;s
assistance and tacit approval, is both an irony and an encouraging sign of the con-

approval

authority of that body.
would prefer that it were otherwise,

tinuing relevance

and

the international legal process
much
that is the product of huis not always efficient, rational, and linear. As with
mankind&apos;s creative instinct, international law mutates, evolves, and progresses in a
halting, oft-times error-ridden fashion. Many decades may pass, and numerous

While many

missteps may be taken, before the realization is
or,

perhaps, acceptable
confidently assert

who

direction exists.

apprehended

that

a more

effective

the consternation of those

Undoubtedly
most straight-forward

identification of the

to

and

appropriate
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way
are

to secure

the elimination of troublesome international

often voiced of

a

role for the United Nations. But the

collaborate with others in that international forum
of nations

to

legal issues, suggestions
mere fact of having to

resolve difficulties

facing the

and

immensely frustrating
complicated. For
the
role
UN&apos;s
in addressing insome,
provides adequate
minimizing
ternational. problems, even though specific legal rules may require a particular interpretation to accomplish that objective. For others, however, this simply highlights the fact that the international legal process has the capacity to promote intercommunity

can

this

prove

reason

for

beyond those immediately linked to the resolution of
problems. Legal issues, and the methods by which they come
to be handled, offer not only opportunities to resolve current, pressing difficulties,
but to assure that longer-term interests interests with no necessary connection to
a problem at-hand
are open for treatment as well.
from
the standpoint of the United States, questions regarding conAdmittedly,
trol over transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil, before as well as after resolution
1483, might have been settled in a cleaner and crisper fashion through exclusive application of the relevant Hague rules on belligerent occupancy. Introducing the notion that the UN legal regime antedating Gulf War 11 survived the ouster of Saddam Hussein and governed subsequent dispositions of such oil provides an unwelcomed and potentially exasperating inconvenience. However, at the same time, it
could well be that that notion serves multiple long-term interests. Most obviously,
ests

and considerations far

specific

international

-

-

it facilitates re-engagement between the United States and historic allies who expressed reservations on Iraq serious enough to frustrate efforts to get a Security
Council resolution authorizing the overall military operation. The importance of

that interest

seems recognized in the very fact the U.S. actively took the lead in
resolution 1483, and there is every reason to believe that same interest
would have been served by acknowledgement of UN control over transferable title

drafting

prior to such resolution&apos;s adoption. Further, there is the long-term interest of
addressing international problems through collective, rather than unilateral or seriously limited multilateral action. Collective action gives voice to the full range of
options available. Through the radically diverse perspectives that thereby emerge,
chances are minimized that a legitimate angle on a solution will be ignored or
pushed to the margins. Positions have to be explained and justified. There is also an
even

increased likelihood that countries consulted in

a

collective process will feel

as

though they have a greater stake in helping to solve problems confronting the international community. Inclusion in a participatory process has the effect of neutralizing one&apos;s inclination to deny that a problem once perceived no longer exists. And,
without putting too fine a line on it, collective action has the further advantage of
assuring that the costs associated with particular solutions are distributed among
all nations, and not borne by a small handful who have acted outside the approval
of the international community.
Apart from these long-term interests in being engaged internationally and acting
through collective rather than unilateral mechanisms, two other relevant interests
served by involvement of the United Nations in the Iraqi situation deserve menZadRV 63 (2003)
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rule-based system of internaimmune from various deficiencies. To

interest in

a

tional relations. Rule-based systems are not
the extent they approve action only when certain clear standards have been met,
they provide frequent opportunity for situations of insufficient evidence to result

complete paralysis. Nonetheless, rule-based systems prevent degeneration into
complete arbitrariness and power politics, and they engender a feeling of fair treatment and even-handedness that can ass in reducing international confrontation.
Perhaps less obvious, but no less significant in the context of the question of control over transferability of Iraqi oil, is the somewhat shorter-term interest in providing international legitimacy to subsequent transactions concerning that oil.
Clearly, by involving the UN, the chances are minimized that legal claims against
such oil are likely to be judged meritorious. Having established a role for the United Nations in dispositions of Iraq&apos;s oil wealth, member states would not be anxious to permit the use of their own courts to inject legal confusion. International
legitimacy provides transactional certainty. And transactional certainty is
indispensable to the quick generation of revenues for the rehabilitation of Iraqs
in

war-torn

infrastructure.
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